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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Utah, and MURRAY CITY, a 
municipal corporation of the 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
-vs-
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic of the 
State of Utah; DELMAR L. 
LARSON, Sheriff of Salt Lake 
County; W. STERLING EVANS, 
Clerk of Salt Lake County, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Case No. 14422 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, ET AL. 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action against Salt Lake County, et al. 
seeking to require the Salt Lake County Clerk and the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff to perform certain services set forth in Title 
21, Utah Code Annotated (1953) for municipal corporations 
without collecting the prescribed fees in advance. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court denied defendants1-appellants' 
motion for summary judgment and granted plaintiffs'-respondents! 
motion for summary judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's 
decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Upon the request of Salt Lake County Sheriff Delmar 
L. Larson, the Salt Lake County Attorney, R. Paul Van Dam, 
issued an opinion dated September 15, 1975, which interpreted 
the provisions of Section 21-7-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
as not exempting municipal corporations from the requirement 
of paying in advance for Title 21 services performed by state 
and county officers. 
Pursuant to the County Attorney1s opinion, defendant-
appellant Sheriff Delmar L. Larson commenced charging municipal 
corporations for service of process in civil cases and defendant-
appellant W. Sterling Evans began charging municipal corporations 
for district court filing fees. 
-2~ 
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Subsequently, the respondent, Salt Lake City, filed 
this action for a declaratory judgment. Respondent, Murray, 
City, intervened as a party plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT SECTION 21-7-2, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED (1953) REQUIRES STATE AND COUNTY OFFICERS 
MENTIONED IN SAID TITLE TO COLLECT PRESCRIBED FEES IN ADVANCE 
OF PERFORMING SERVICES FOR MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 
Certain state and county officers are precluded by 
Section 21-7-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953) from performing any 
official service unless the fees prescribed for such service 
are paid in advance. 
Section 21-7-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953) reads as 
follows: 
"The state and county officers mentioned in 
this title shall not in any case perform any 
official service unless the fees prescribed 
for such service are paid in advance, and on 
such payment the officer must perform the 
services required; and for every failure or 
refusal to perform official duty, when the 
fees are tendered, any officer shall be 
liable upon his official bond; provided, that 
no fees shall be charged the state, or any 
county or subdivision thereon, or any public 
officer acting therefor, or in cases of 
habeas corpus, or in criminal causes before 
final judgment, or for administering and 
certifying the oath of office, or for 
-3-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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swearing pensioners and their witnesses, 
or for filing and recommending bonds for 
public officers.11 (Emphasis added.) 
The underlined clauses in the above-cited code 
section exempt the state, or any county or subdivision thereof, 
or any public officer acting therefor from the requirement of 
paying the prescribed fees set forth in Title 21, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953). Cities are not mentioned within the class 
of exempt bodies politic. The language above-cited is straight-
forward and not ambiguous. 
The Constitution of Utah1 specifies that the legal 
subdivisions of a county are (1) precincts and (2) school 
districts. 
This Court has stated: 
"Foundational rules require that we 
assume that each term of a statute was used 
advisedly, and that each should be given an 
interpretation and application in accord with 
their usually accepted meaning, unless the 
context otherwise requires.!f^ 
The words as used in Section 21-7-2, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) convey the full meaning of the exemption and 
are not proper subjects for "reading in11 entities which were 
expressly left out. 
Article XI, Section 1, Constitution of Utah, 
2
 Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 U.2d 100, 102, 485 
P.2d 1035 (1971). ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
_/. 
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POINT II 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ARE NOT SUBDIVISIONS OF THE STATE OR A 
COUNTY AS CONTEMPLATED BY THE STATUTE IN QUESTION. 
Cities and towns are incorporated pursuant to state 
3 
statuteo They are creatures of the legislature and act 
autonomously from county government once incorporation is 
4 
completeo 
Residents of a municipal corporation are also residents 
of the county and vote for county officials as well as for city 
officialso However, it is clear that once incorporation is 
complete, a municipal corporation becomes autonomous and cannot 
be considered a subdivision of the county, 
Antieau on Local Governmental Law treats this subject 
as follows: 
"Counties are frequently distinguished 
from municipal corporations proper, such as 
cities, in that the former are involuntary 
entities imposed upon residents by the state. 
Thus, the Wisconsin court has said: 
'Those fundamental distinctions 
between municipal corporations proper 
on the one hand, and counties . . . 
on the other, exist at the present 
time in the same sense and to the 
same degree as they existed at the 
time of the constitution. A county 
is a political subdivision of the «^ 
Chapter 2, Title 10, Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
Section 10-2-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953). j r 
•^2:C_ 
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state . . . . It is not created for 
the local convenience of the inhabi-
tants as in the case of cities and 
villages. It exists not by virtue 
of its own will or consent, but as a 
result of the superimposed will of 
the state.f"5 
The several counties of this state are legal subdi-
visions of the state6 and are bodies corporate and politic of the 
state0' 
Although municipal corporations are creatures of state 
statute, they are not necessarily subdivisions of the state. 
Business corporations also owe their existence to state statute; 
however, they are not therefore assumed to be subdivisions of 
the state. 
This Court has never been properly faced with the 
precise issue of whether municipal corporations are subdivi-
sions, legal or political, of the State of Utah. However, even 
if it were determined that cities are currently considered 
"political subdivisions11 of the state, it is submitted that they 
are not "legal" subdivisions as contemplated in the Constitution 
and by the legislature of 1898 in enacting Section 1016 of the 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898, 
Antieau, Local Governmental Law, Volume 4, County Law, 
Section 31.00, pages 4 and 5. The cited Wisconsin case is 
State v. Schinz, 216 N.W. 509 (1927). 
Article XI, Section 1, Constitution of Utah. 
Section 17-4-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
-6-
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Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides that: 
"The several counties of the Territory 
of Utah, existing at the time of the adoption 
of this Constitution, are hereby recognized 
as legal subdivisions of this State, and the 
precincts, and school districts, now existing 
in said counties, as legal subdivisions 
thereof, and they shall so continue until 
changed by law in pursuance of this article." 
The framers of the Constitution treated municipal 
corporations independently and apart from other bodies politic 
with no reference to them as being legal subdivisions of the state. 
The above-cited section of the Constitution of Utah was 
read and passed without amendment by the constitutional conven-
8 tion0 The language was copied from Article XI, Section 1 of 
the California Constitution except for the addition of language 
establishing precincts and school districts as legal subdivisions 
of counties. 
The California Supreme Court faced this issue some 
time ago in several decisions which adroitly dealt with identi-
cal issues of fact and a portion of one of their first 
decisions is set forth below; 
"Article 11 is on the subject of 'Cities, 
Counties, and Towns.1 The first five 
sections relate entirely to the organiza-
tion and management of county governments, 
the first section giving to them a desig-
Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, March 27, 
1895, page 397. . 
7-
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nation different from that of 'municipal 
corporation.1 It reads: fThe several 
counties, as they now exist, are hereby 
recognized as legal subdivisions of this 
state0f With the sixth section commence 
the provisions in reference to municipal 
corporations, and it and the two following 
sections are devoted exclusively to that 
subject, having nothing in them relating 
to counties or county government0"" 
Sections 1 through 4 of Article XI of the Constitution 
of Utah relate entirely to the organization and management of 
county governments, whereas Sections 5 and 6 relate exclusively 
to municipal corporations. 
The California Supreme Court has specifically and 
consistently ruled that cities are not even "political subdivi-
sions11 of that state* ° The difference between the term 
"legal subdivisions", as used in the Constitution, and the 
term "political subdivisions", as used in recent legislation 
and Supreme Court opinions, has never been clarified. 
"At the time of the adoption of the 
constitution, the governmental and political 
subdivisions were simple* I doubt if 
districts, as we know them, for local and 
particular benefits were in the contempla-
tion of the drafters of our Constitution."11 
9 
People v. McFadden, 22 P. 851, 853 and 854 (1889). 
10 
Otis v. City of Los Angeles, 126 P.2d 954, 52 CA2d 605 
(1942). 
Justice Wolfe's concurring opinion in Tygesen v. Magna 
Water Co., 119 U. 274, 299, 226 P.2d 127, 140 (195U). 
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( 
It is submitted that the term "political subdivision" is a 
more recent phrase that was never contemplated by the framers 
of the Constitution, and in using the term "county or sub-
division thereof" in Section 1016 of the Revised Statutes of 
Utah, 1898, only "legal subdivisions" of the county were 
intended to be included. 
To support the lower courtfs ruling, its memorandum 
opinion reasoned that "under Section 17-16-5, cities shall 
be deemed 'one precinct1 within the county and since precincts, 
as then existing and until changed by law, are flegal subdi-
visions1 under Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution of 
Utah, it would appear that cities as precincts . .
 0 (are) 
1legal subdivisions1 within the counties and state." 
Section 17-16-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953) provides: 
". o o In cities in which a city court exists no justice of 
the peace shall be elected, but such cities shall be deemed 
precincts for the purpose of electing constables therein." 
The above-cited section does not provide that cities 
shall be deemed precincts for any other purpose--such as quali-
fying for exemption from paying Supreme Court filing fees0 
That section of our code is specifically limited to only one 
instance where a city is deemed to be a precinct of the 
county. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Constables, as elected precinct officers, are not 
19 deemed city or county officers or employees . when serving civil 
process emanating out of city court at least with reference to 
being entitled to receive workman's compensation payments0 
"Before 1917 all process out of the city 
courts was required to be served by sheriffs 
out of the county and the sheriff was required 
to serve it, that is to say the only party 
who had capacity to serve civil process out of 
city courts except summonses, was the sheriff, 
and he was required to serve it,"13 
This is not to say that the sheriff was required to 
serve civil process out of city courts free of charge«, The 1917 
amendment to what is now Section 17-25-1, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) was passed in order to allow the constables in city 
precincts to obtain more fee business0 The various precinct 
courts of Salt Lake County use their elected constables to serve 
both criminal and civil process. They do not use the sheriff. 
The county pays for the constables1 services on a fee-for-service 
basis, just as the respondents should be paying its constables or 
using its uniformed police officers to serve process. 
The lower court's opinion, if supported on appeal, 
might stand for the proposition that a city is a subdivision of 
(1932). 
13 
12 
Rich Vo Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 511, 15 PG2d 641 
Ibid, page 5150 
Ibid, page 515. 
-10-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the county in which it liesc This would be contrary to the 
whole body of case law developed in this state. 
In Lehi City vQ Meiling, City Recorder, 87 Utah 237, 
48 P02d 530, this Court ruled on the constitutionality of the 
Metropolitan Water District Act. That case is relevant to 
this case insofar as the phrase flor subdivision thereof" is 
construed as it is used in the ConstitutionQ 
"It is strongly argued that the act, 
which permits the district to become indebted 
in a sum not exceeding 10 per cent of the 
value of the taxable property of the district, 
is a violation of sections 3 and 4 of article 
14 of the Constitutiono Section 3 provides 
that fno debt in excess of the taxes for the 
current year shall be created~~iEy" any county 
or subdivision tnereof, or by any "school" 
district therein', or by any city, town or 
village, or any suBHivision thereoT in"this 
STateV unless authorized by a majority vote 
of the electors therein. Section 4 limits the 
debt of counties and then provides fno 
city, town, school district or other municipal 
corporation, shall become indebted to an 
amount, including existing indebtedness, 
exceeding four per centum of the value of 
the taxable property therein.1 
"Two questions are involved in this 
objection. One arises out of the use of 
the repeated phrase in section 3 'or sub-
division thereof1 appiicaETe" to counties 
in one instance ana to any city, town or 
village' in the "other. Is there a necessary 
implication from this language that the 
Constitution makers intended to limit the 
indebtedness which the people may incur 
through any and all public agencies to 
the percentages of assessed valuation 
specified in section 4? .
 0 o " 
- 1 1 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"Obviously, if any subdivision of a 
county created a debt it would have to be 
computed as part of the county debt, or if 
any subdivision of a city created a debt 
it would be computed as part of the city 
debt. Light is thrown on the use of the 
word !subdivision' by reference to article 
11, ;§ 1, wherein precincts and school districts 
are referred to as subdivisions of the county. 
Precincts are governmental in character and -
are subdivisions of the county but have no 
separate corporate existence/ (The Legis-
lature has not conferred on any precinct the 
power to create a debt. If such were done 
:
 undoubtedly that debt would be computed as 
part of the debt of the county.) School 
districts, although a subdivision of a county, 
are recognized as having independent debt 
limitations by article 14, § § 3 and 40 It 
is significant that true municipalities 
such as cities and towns are nowhere referred 
to in our Constitution as subdivisions of the 
county but are regarded as public agencies 
of government deriving their powers directly 
from the state by means of general laws to 
be enacted by the Legislature or by home 
rule charter pursuant to article 11, § 50" 
(Emphasis added.) 
If a city is to be considered a subdivision of the 
county because it is deemed a precinct for the purpose of 
electing constables, then wouldn't it follow that the county 
would be responsible for city-created debts? It is submitted 
that to extend the limited use of the term "precinct11 as it 
applies to cities in Section 17-16-5, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) to include cities as subdivisions of counties as referred 
to in Section 21-7-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953), is improper. 
-12-
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POINT III 
EVEN IF SECTION 21-7-2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) WERE 
CONSTRUED AS AMBIGUOUS, RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT 
APPELLANTS1 INTERPRETATION THAT MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ARE NOT 
EXEMPTED. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the clear meaning and intent 
of the legislature cannot be ascertained by a reading of Section 
21-7-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953), long established rules of 
statutory construction support appellants1 contention that 
municipal corporations are not exempted from payment in advance 
for services delineated in Chapters 1 and 2, Title 21, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953) performed by state and county officials. 
aD The Doctrine of Expressio Unius Est Exclusio 
Alterius. This well recognized doctrine states the proposition 
that when the statutory language specifically enumerates certain 
things or classes of things upon which it operates, inference 
arises that all things or classes of things omitted from the 
statute were intentionally omitted by the legislature* 
Section 21-7-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953) specifically 
lists those entities which are exempted from payment in advance 
for Chapter 2 services (1) the state, (2) counties and their 
subdivisions,, By operation of the doctrine of expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius, the omission of• municipal corporations 
from one of the classes exempted by Section 21-7-2, Utah Code 
-13-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Annotated (1953) creates the inference that they were intentionally 
omitted by the legislature. 
b. The Last Antecedent Doctrine. Under the "last 
antecedent doctrine" of statutory construction, relative and 
qualifying words, phrases and clauses in a statute should be 
applied to the words and phrases immediately preceding and 
should not be construed as extending to or including others more 
15 
remote. 
The relative or qualifying word or phrase in Section 
21-7-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953) is "or subdivision thereof". 
This doctrine prescribes that said clause or phrase refers 
to the word "county" and not to the more remote word "state". 
A different construction of this statute would be 
tenuous indeedQ The respondents urged the lower court to 
construe the whole phrase "county or subdivision thereof" as 
qualifying the word "state". This construction is improper in 
that (1) the county is an entity that is one of the things 
specifically delineated as having an exempt status, and (2) the 
county is a legal subdivision of the state. Therefore, it would 
make no sense at all to construe the word "county" as qualifying 
(1941). 
16 
1 5
 In re Goldworthy's Estate, 115 P.2d 627, 45 N.M. 406 
Article XI, Section 1, Constitution of Utah. 
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the word "state" since it would be simply duplicative. 
c. Punctuation Marks. Punctuation marks are a proper 
guide in interpreting the meaning of a statute0 Since the words 
"subdivision thereof" appear in the clause which delineates 
county, and said clause is separated before and after the rest 
of the sentence by commas, an inference is created that the words 
"subdivision thereof" apply and are relative only to the word 
"county". 
POINT IV , , _ 
THE OBJECTIVE AND PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATURE IN ENACTING SECTION 
21-7-2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) WAS TO EXEMPT THE STATE, THE 
COUNTY AND ITS SUBDIVISIONS FROM PAYING FEES TO COUNTY AND STATE 
OFFICERS PRESCRIBED IN TITLE 21. 
This Court has on many occasions expressed its view 
that statutes should be looked at as a whole and in light of 
the general purposes they were intended to serve, and they 
should be so interpreted as to accomplish that objective. ' 
Appellants submit that the general purpose and 
objective of Section 21-7-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953) is to 
exempt the state, the county and its legal subdivisions from 
paying for Title 21 servicesc This reasoning is logical in 
Andrus vP Allred, 17 U.2d 106, 404 P.2d 972 (1965). 
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light of the fact that both the state and the counties share 
in the financing and administration of the district courts, 
Mimicipal corporations finance and administer their own court 
systems and do not directly contribute to the financing or 
operation of the district court0 Most civil matters that the 
city is involved with can be handled by its own city court 
free of charge, and the civil service of process effected by 
its own elected constables or police officers. 
Section 10-6-66, Utah Code Annotated (1953) provides 
that "all police officers of any city shall possess the powers 
conferred upon constables by law.11 This section of the code 
empowers the respondent Salt Lake Cityfs 348 police officers 
to serve and return all process emanating out of the courts of 
this state free of charge to the respondent. 
When the respondents have a civil cause of action 
that comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district 
court, the costs of court (district and supreme court filing 
fees and service of process fees) are recoverable from the 
appellants if their claims are meritorious,, 
Municipal corporations are not granted free access 
to federal court, nor will the federal marshall serve civil 
process without collecting his fees in advance0 This is the 
case even though the respondents1 residents pay various 
federal taxes0 
-16-
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If the legislature determines that municipal 
corporations should be exempted from paying in advance for 
Title 21 services, it should amend Section 21-7-2, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) to so effect their intento 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that Section 21-7-2, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) requires state and county officers 
to collect their prescribed fees in advance of performing Title 
21 services for municipal corporations. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
DONALD SAWAYA 
Chief Civil Deputy County Attorney 
RALPH Do CROCKETT 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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